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Abstract
Microbiological war and terrorist attacks are made to weaken populations by transmitting pathogenic and epidemic microorganisms. These
bacteria or viruses are often difﬁcult to diagnose. Anthrax alerts following September 2001 showed that most clinical microbiology
laboratories were not adequately prepared, using obsolete diagnostic methods or being too slow to use accurate tools when facing a major
threat. Following this period, most microbiology laboratories were prepared for bioterrorism alerts, in order to provide accurate and rapid
results, although such events are rare and unexpected. In this review, we describe the organization and preparedness of our clinical
microbiology laboratory regarding bioterrorism risk, although its main task is to perform routine diagnostic microbiology tests. To illustrate
the difﬁculties, we brieﬂy describe an anthrax alert.
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Since September 2001, it has been obvious that clinical
microbiology laboratories should be prepared for the danger
of sudden intentionally caused or natural epidemics. They must
be ready to quickly identify agents that are rare and difﬁcult to
recognize, because they are not usually encountered, and
bioterrorism attack is one of these threats. The pathogens that
are considered to be ‘bioterrorism agents’ are described in the
ﬁrst article of this issue, and, as outlined in this article by
Grobusch et al. [1], anthrax represents one of the major
threats.
For most clinical microbiologists, anthrax was a Gram-po-
sitive bacillus affecting mainly animals, and thus mainly
concerning veterinary microbiologists. It was also known that
this bacterium is capable of forming spores that can persist in
the soil for years, and that humans could be infected only
rarely, except in a few well-deﬁned endemic countries.
Therefore, it was difﬁcult for clinical microbiologists to
recognize Bacillus anthracis. Indeed, although culture of B. anth-
racis is straightforward, identiﬁcation at the species level was a
major challenge until the availability of matrix-assisted laser
desorption ionization time-of-ﬂight (MALDI-TOF) mass spec-
trometry (MS) and corresponding databases, given the signif-
icant relatedness between B. anthracis and other Bacillus
species. For laboratories using Bruker MALDI-TOF MS, a
dedicated database for ‘bioterrorism agents’ is available and
mandatory. Without this additional database, diagnosis may be
delayed, owing to the absence of B. anthracis in the routinely
used MALDI-TOF MS database, and false identiﬁcation has
been documented recently for one case [2]. Even the
identiﬁcation of a strain with 16S rDNA PCR and sequencing
did not allow the different species of Bacillus to be distin-
guished, as B. anthracis, Bacillus cereus and Bacillus thuringiensis
are closely related [3]. Now, most clinical laboratories are
using the extended biosafety agents Bruker database, which
greatly facilitates the identiﬁcation of the above organisms as
well as other bioterrorism agents, such as Francisella tularensis.
As these agents are uncommon and rarely detected in human
samples routinely received in diagnostic laboratories, clinical
microbiologists need to be prepared to be able to adequately
face any potential alert (Table 1).
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After the terrorist attacks of September 2001, we realized
that not all diagnostic laboratories were equally prepared for a
bioterrorism event, and that the microbial diagnostic methods
were often obsolete, slow, and/or inaccurate. Thus, selected
laboratories had to implement the required preparedness level
and tools to anticipate the threat and to be able to detect the
possible agents, such as B. anthracis, in different types of
sample, including environmental samples, and to detect a
putative genetically modiﬁed agent.
Before 2001, nothing was ready, as if we had forgotten that,
already in the Middle Ages, bodies infected by plague were
used for transmitting the disease to enemies (see the historical
review in this issue by Barras and Geub [4]). The aim was to
weaken populations by transmitting diseases, infecting their
cattle, or contaminating their soil and cultures, and so to
create a public panic. Thus, major goals of clinical microbiology
laboratories when facing a suspected sample are: (i) to be able
to detect the agent in the rare event that it might be present;
(ii) to reassure the authorities that the examined sample is not
harbouring the sought pathogenic agent when it is indeed
absent; and (iii) to handle the specimen according to speciﬁed
rules, to avoid dispersion and transmission to laboratory
technicians. Indeed, bioterrorism agents are generally highly
lethal and stable in the environment, and are often infectious
via aerosols and/or highly infectious (low infectious dose) [3].
For most conventional pathogens detected routinely by
clinical microbiologists, the classic approaches of direct
examination and culture on axenic media are sufﬁcient.
However, for microorganisms that are difﬁcult and dangerous
to handle (such as B. anthracis, Yersinia pestis, Brucella species,
F. tularensis, and Coxiella burnetii), molecular diagnosis repre-
sents the most accurate, sensitive and speciﬁc tool, as well as
the safest approach to be used for their detection. Detailed
protocols should be available to provide an optimal level of
preparedness, because, by deﬁnition, these events are unex-
pected. Moreover, to achieve high reproducibility, speciﬁcity,
and sensitivity, internal and external quality controls must be
performed on a regular basis. Nowadays, it is possible to
develop PCRs without using dangerous real ‘positive controls’
by using plasmids that will serve as positive controls for the
PCRs. The danger associated with the preparation and use of
positive controls is thus drastically reduced. Moreover, for the
suspected sample, one can inactivate the specimen in order to
handle harmful samples after extraction of nucleic acids.
In practice, in large diagnostic laboratories such as ours, a
signiﬁcant level of preparedness has been developed to enable
recognition of the problem at the very beginning, providing the
opportunity to respond to this threat with the highest level of
accuracy and without delay.
In this review, we report an anthrax alert as an example, and
we use our past experiences to describe the organization and
the technological tools that we implemented to face such alerts.
An Anthrax Alert in April 2007
In April 2007 at 10:45 a.m., our laboratory received a
telephone call from the ﬁre department regarding an anthrax
alert. A previous alert had occurred >3 years earlier, and no
speciﬁc, regular training had been implemented. However,
internal procedures were available through our intranet-ver-
iﬁed documentation system, allowing us to quickly ﬁll the
information and preparedness gap. These protocols include
descriptions of reagents, nucleic extraction procedures,
primer and probe sequences, concentrations of reagents used,
and positive controls.
According to our internal procedure, before the arrival of
the sample, and immediately after having received the initial
call, the person on duty informed the biosecurity ofﬁcer of the
hospital and of the laboratory, the head of microbiology, the
head of molecular diagnostics, and the heads of all laboratories
located close to the biosafety ‘bioterrorism’ laboratory. Before
the sample arrived, protocols were quickly read again by the
clinical microbiologist in charge and two senior laboratory
technicians requested to handle the specimen. The biosafety
laboratory was also checked for the presence of active
biocides and all other necessary supplies.
At 12:55 p.m., the sample arrived safely, brought by a
ﬁreﬁghter (Fig. 1a). As soon as the sample arrived, the
supervisor and one of the technicians allocated to this task
obtained additional information on the nature of the sample,
and performed a ﬁrst external disinfection. Once the
announcement sheet had been completed with all administra-
tive information, the glove box containing the envelope was
transported to the bioterrorism laboratory under the bio-
safety ﬂow hood. The envelope could not be seen, as several
layers of plastic bags and absorbing paper surrounded it. To
work in the biosafety level 3 laboratory, the three persons
wore dedicated outerwear, consisting of a waterproof suit,
waterproof gloves, hair and shoe protectors, and a 3 M mask
(Fig. 1b). As these three persons—members of the routine
staff—had to be dedicated to this unexpected task, part of the
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routine work was delayed, and this had to be reorganized by a
fourth person. Before the letter was opened, a second
disinfection was performed; the successive layers were then
carefully opened, and a letter containing a powder was found
(Fig. 1c). All of these processes were performed by both
technicians with the advice and lead of the supervisor, one
technician working strictly under the ﬂow hood, and the other
technician providing the necessary reagents and instruments
and taking care of the garbage.
The sample was then processed manually under the
biosafety ﬂow hood according to the procedure for Qiagen
DNA extraction. As soon as DNA was extracted, real-time
PCR was performed in our routine molecular diagnostic
platform by one of the technicians (Fig. 1d). In practice, to
increase the speciﬁcity, three PCRs are used, targeting the
chromosomal DNA of B. anthracis and the plasmid-encoded
pag gene and cap gene, respectively. The second technician
carefully cleaned the ﬂow hood with the help of the supervisor
(Fig. 1e). The negative PCR result for B. anthracis was available
at 10 p.m. (Fig. 1f), and was validated and immediately
reported to the authorities.
The signiﬁcant amount of time needed to process the
sample was attributable to: (i) the careful opening of the
multiple layers surrounding the sample; (ii) inactivation steps
and the manual DNA extraction protocol; and (iii) uncertain-
ties regarding each step, owing to the relatively rare nature of
such an event.
This example highlights the main difﬁculties that one may
face as a clinical microbiologist when dealing with an anthrax
alert, which are principally: (i) the full availability of dedicated
technicians trained to work carefully, efﬁciently and adequately
in a biosafety level 3 environment, despite signiﬁcant pressure;
and (ii) the rare nature of such alerts.
Discussion
Bioterrorism or biowarfare can take different forms aimed at
deliberately weakening populations by transmitting diseases. It
has existed for many centuries in various forms, and in recent
years this threat was transiently large (after 11 September
2001), but now its occurrence has again decreased to a basal
low level. Nevertheless, clinical microbiologists should be
ready to deal with alerts adequately. In Switzerland, some
diagnostic microbiology laboratories are ready in case of a




FIG. 1. An anthrax alert in April 2007.
(a) The sample was brought by a
ﬁreﬁghter, and detailed information on
the situation was obtained. (b) The
laboratory technicians and one clinical
microbiologist were allocated to handle
the sample, and wore protective gloves
and clothes. (c) After removal of all
protective plastic layers, the nature of
the sample (sand-like powder) could be
seen. (d) DNA was extracted. (e) After
real-time PCR had been started, the ﬂow
hood was cleaned. (f) The result of the
PCR was obtained, showing positivity of all
positive controls, including the inhibitory
control (spiked specimen), negativity of all
the negative controls, and negativity of the
tested sample.
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such laboratories do not have access to a biosafety level 4
(BSL4) laboratory, national and supranational reference cen-
tres are warranted to conﬁrm positive cases.
Currently, four BSL4 laboratories are available in Switzer-
land: (i) the biology section of the Federal Ofﬁce for Civil
Protection (http://www.labor-spiez.ch/), which is responsible
for the analysis and diagnosis of highly pathogenic biological
agents and toxins, including anthrax (http://www.vbi.unibe.ch/
content/nant/index_eng.html), and also provides scientiﬁc
support, biosafety education, training, and research; (ii) the
National Reference Centre for Emerging Viral Infections
(CRIVE), located at the University Hospital of Geneva, which
is is devoted to the detection of emerging and re-emerging
viruses, including haemorrhagic viruses (http://virologie.hug-ge.
ch/centres_reference/crive); (iii) the IVI veterinary BSL4 lab-
oratory of Mittelh€ausern (http://www.blv.admin.ch/ivi/); and
(iv) the BSL4 of the University Hospital of Z€urich.
Overall, bioterrorism preparedness implies regular controls
and regular training to maintain the necessary skills and to
reduce stress and delay when a suspected sample needs to be
handled. Thus, in our laboratory in Lausanne, we are testing
B. anthracis primers and probes monthly, using 10, 100 and
1000 copies/reaction positive controls. Moreover, in Switzer-
land, a proﬁciency quality control procedure is organized by
the Swiss NBC-Protection laboratory (Spiez), and distributed
to each laboratory in charge of handling such specimens, in
order to test the analytical results, the time needed to obtain
the results, and the overall alert system and the response to an
alert.
In conclusion, bioterrorism events may occur sporadically
and have been reported for centuries [4], and several agents
may be associated with signiﬁcant mortality and morbidity if
released in signiﬁcant amounts [5]. Thus, despite bioterrorism
alerts being rare events, clinical microbiologists should be
ready to face them.
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